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SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION
GAILLARD T. HUNT*

"such men as had the fear of God before them, and made some
conscience of what they did."
-Cromwell on his army.'

T

HE AMERICAN CATHOLIC BISHOPS have asked for recognition of

selective conscientious objection to the draft,2 and much other comment has appeared lately supporting this view.-" I will show in this
article that the Selective Service System's rule against selective objection is not supported by legal authority, and indeed has been rejected
4
by the Supreme Court. It is possible the draft will go away soon. If
so, we should not let the impression stand that selective objection was
legally excluded during the extraordinary twenty-one year peacetime
draft we are leaving behind us as a precedent.
Selective objection, of course, is only a tiny part of the conscien-

*LL.B., Columbia University.
1 SIR CHARLES FIRTH,
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(1953).
" Human Life in Our Day, PASTORAL LETTER OF THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC BISHOPS,
Nov. 15, 1968, issued from Washington, D.C., available as a supplement to 18
ENGLAND 84

CATHOLIC STANDARD (1968).

3 The World Council of Churches has endorsed selective objection. N.Y. Times,
July 17, 1968, at 1, col. 3, and 10, col. I. See also Cohen, THE NATION, July 8,
1968, at 11; E. B. Haskell, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Oct. 30, 1968, at 1373. Some
members of the Marshall Commission proposed this, but the majority rejected this
idea. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON SELECTIVE SERVICE
48-51 (1967) (hereinafter the MARSHALL REPORT). Rep. Edward I. Koch of New
York has introduced several bills to remove doubt that selective objection is
recognized. Those first introduced are: H.R. 7885, H.R. 10500, and H.R. 10501,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Mr. Koch believes these bills are only declaratory,
and that the present law allows selective objection. 115 CONG. REC. G. 303
(Feb. 27, 1969); N.Y. Times Magazine, April 13, 1969, at 14.
4 See, e.g., Mr. Koch's "Volunteer Military Service Act" H.R. 10174, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969).

15
tious objector problem. The procedure for
claiming a conscientious objection itself
changes the nature of the privilege. 5 The
applicant must convince his local board he
is "sincere,"! a test so global as to strike
at the very hope of equal treatment. The

5 Comment, The Selective Service: An Administrative Obstacle Course, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 2123
(1966). When a registrant tells his board he objects to service, he is given Selective Service Form
150, asking the exact nature of his objection,
where he learned it, etc. 32 C.F.R. § 122.11
(1962). The local board grants or denies the
exemption on the basis of the form or any other
information they have. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.11,
1622.14 (1962). If the exemption is denied, the
registrant has thirty days in which to demand a
personal appearance before the board, at which he
must appear alone unless the board consents to
hear someone on his behalf. 32 C.F.R. § 1624.1
(1962). If he is again refused his exemption, the
objector can go to an appeal board, 32 C.F.R.
§ 1626.2 (1962) and if he is refused there with
a dissent, he can go to the Presidential appeal
board. 32 C.F.R. § 1627.3 (1962). Before the
1967 amendments, cases were referred to the
Justice Department when the registrant appealed
from a local board denial of an exemption.
Formerly 50 U.S.C. APP. § 456(j) (1964). There
a hearing was held before an unpaid volunteer
hearing officer, whose findings were sent to the
conscientious objector section, which wrote a
formal Justice Department recommendation. The
recommendation went to the appeal board,
which made the actual decision, and the registrant could send the appeal board a rebuttal to
the Justice Department recommendation. The
F.B.I. made an investigation before the hearing,
and their report was given to the hearing examiner. The registrant had a right only to a
summary of anything derogatory in the F.B.I.
reports. Gonzales v. United States, 364 U.S. 59
(1960); United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S.
1 (1953). The Justice Department procedure
was eliminated in 1967 because it was causing
delays "exceeding 2 years." 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
1308, 1334 (1967) (reporting-on S. 1432).
6Smith & Bell, The Conscientious Objector
Program-A Search for Sincerity, 19 U. PITT.
L. REV. 695 (1958).
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1967 amendments 7 removed the Justice
Department's advice from the process, so
that now the decision is made at a local
s
board meeting, with no right to counsel
9
with amateur administrators, in an inquisitorial rather than adversary proceeding,
with a record to be used against the registrant built up over the years since he
turned 18, and with any right to appeal
sharply limited by the lack of transcript.1 0
The basic test, that the registrant be opposed to military service by reason of religious training and belief," is also an anomaly in our law, even as broadened by
12
United States v. Seeger.
We might then be critical of the Bishops
for passing by all these problems. Their
only procedural thought is the naive observation that, if selective objection is
recognized, it should be "not easy"13 to

7Pub. L. No. 90-40, 81 Stat. 100 (June 30,
1967). The appeal now goes to the appeal board
only on what is in the file, plus whatever written
statement the registrant might add. It may seem
a boon to have the F.B.I. out of the process, but
this will mean the registrant's statements must be
subject to extra scrutiny for inconsistencies and
unlikelihoods. No doubt many F.B.I. reports
were favorable, and the unfavorable ones at
least gave the registrant something to argue
about.
832 C.F.R. § 1624.1(b) (1962).
9Local board members are unpaid, part-time
volunteers. The Marshall Commission found
many of them do not approve of the conscientious objection exemption at all. MARSHALL REPORT 108-09

(1967).

'032 C.F.R. § 1624.2(b) (1962). Some boards
have let in stenographers hired by the registrant, or tape recorders. I SELECTIVE SERVICE
LAW REPORTER 27.
1150 U.S.C. APP. 456(j)

(1964).

12380 U.S. 163 (1964).
13 Human Life in Our Day, CATHOLIC STANDARD,

Supp. No. 47, Nov. 21, 1968, at 8, col. 3.
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get the privilege, and the recommendation
that full alternative service 14 should be exacted from any objector. The Bishops seem
unaware that an objector who followed
their guides for judging the war might be
refused the exemption not because he was
selective but because the local board
thought he was not religious enough, or
simply did not believe him."
But there are reasons the Bishops might
single out the issue of selective objection.
The requirement that a registrant object
to all wars is often a trap at the very
threshold. The Director of Selective Service for New York City, for instance, has
told his local boards to ask men who apply
for the exemption:
If this country were invaded by a strong,
powerful nation which was being popularly lead by an irresponsible, irrational
leader intent upon subjecting the people
of the United States to his will, and with
whom all conceivable methods of peacefully negotiating the situation had failed,
would he, the registrant, comply with a
call to arms issued by the President of
his Country? 16
The Bishops do not seem to be aware of the
suggestion that alternative civilian service may
be harder to justify under the Constitution than
military service, which has tradition and necessity
to back it up. The problem is a marginal one
now, but suggestions have been made to replace
the draft with a program of national service,
where every young man would spend two years
in the Peace Corps or some other useful program, or go into the army. This would require a
new view of the United States as the font of all
social usefulness, or else a new view of young
persons as something less than citizens.
15The Bishops' naivety is distressing both intrinsically and for what it shows about their
contact with the peace movement within their
own Church.
16 Memorandum, dated October 10, 1967, sent
,14

A question like this, or a question whether
the registrant approves of the war against
Hitler or the Civil War, 17 is likely to keep
the board from reaching questions like
whether the objection is religiously motivated. Remember that no local board is
likely to have more than an occasional objector, and that members have no way of
accumulating experience with the problem;18 it may be insurmountable if the
registrant admits his religion would let him
fight under some circumstances. So the issue is important: does an admission that
he believes there may be times when it is
all right to make war block a registrant, automatically and without chance of exception, from an exemption he would otherwise get?
20
'
Hugh C. Macgill," John H. Mansfield
and Ralph Potter,2" have ably covered the
policy merits of this problem. They argue

by the Director of the Selective Service of the
City of New York to all appeal boards in that
area, cited in Reisner, The Conscientious Objector Exemption: Administrative Procedures and
Judicial Review, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 686, 701
n.88 (1968).
17 "[Tlhey all want to fight Hitler, but you see
we don't have him in stock." Hearings on Extension of the Universal Military Training and
Service Act Before House Armed Services Committee, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 2636 (1968)
(testimony of Gen. Hershey).
15 Conscientious objectors are a fraction of one
percent of the draft pool. See the Annual Reports of the Director of Selective Service.
19Macgill, Selective Conscientious Objection:
Divine Will and Legislative Grace, 54 VA. L.
REV. 1355 (1968).
20 Mansfield,
Conscientious Objection-1964
Term, 3 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 50
(1965).
21 Potter, Conscientious Objection to Particular
Wars, 4 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 44
(1968).
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that no purpose is served by excluding
from the privilege a genuine selective objector, and that there may be constitutional reasons why he cannot be excluded
if those who object to all wars are allowed
the privilege. But I would like to go back
and pick up a preliminary question: does
the law as it stands now necessarily exclude
a selective objector?
At the outset we should note that there
is little hope of understanding or cataloguing the varieties of selective objectors.
Some rest on grounds other than the obvious evils of war: there are objectors who
think America's racial history makes their
22
service in the American army wrong;
others object to the medical treatment in
the army; 23 the Harshamites of Illinois are
said to object to being "yoked with unbelievers" 2 4-and so on. The just war theorists take a variety of positions on what
the just war theory means: some say it
excludes all modern wars, 25 while others
say Vietnam is a just war, 26 so just war

22 Clark

v.

Gabriel,

393

U.S.

256

(1969);

United States v. Lewis, 275 F. Supp. 1013
(E.D. Wis. 1967).
23United States v. Carson, 282 F. Supp. 261
(E. D. Ark. 1968).
24 See Smith & Bell, supra, note 6; 19 U. PITT.
L. REV. 695, 721 (1958). 11 Corinthians 6:14.
25 J. RYAN, MODERN WAR AND BASIC ETHICS
(1940). See Spiro's beliefs from United States v.
Spiro, 384 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1967), discussed
below.
26 Fr. John Courtney Murray, in a commencement address in the spring of 1967, 113 CONG.
REC. 15779-81 (1967), said he could make out
the case for Vietnam as a just war. He seems
to rely on an argument that a declaration of war
is presumptively valid. There are, of course,
two presumptions: a presumption against war
and a presumption in favor of solemnly promulgated congressional or executive findings.
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objectors must differ among themselves as
to why they are objecting. Even among the
traditional peace churches there are pacifists who are reluctant to say they would
never fight in extraordinary circumstances
to prevent a greater evil. 27 For the time
being, however, we may lump all those
selective objectors together, since a general
rule against selective objection would refuse them all.
Also at the outset we should reaffirm the
validity of a consicentious objection exemption. I suggest that the exemption has a
more specific rationale than the balancing
2s
of religious liberty against social needs.
I offer the theory that the public mind has
accepted a draft from time to time because
it felt on those occasions that there was a
great national purpose which the draftees
would share. The drafts were coercive only
in that the men were forced to lay aside
their private preoccupations. It was believed that once the man left his job, once
he was coerced enough to break loose from
his routine and to overcome practical obstacles, he would then see himself as part
of something well worth fighting in. For
instance, when Holmes undertook to apologize for his pride in having fought in the
Civil War, he said something the most inconvenienced or frightened draftee would
find consoling: "I think that, as life is ac-

It is the extension of the latter presumption to
protect implicit findings that would nullify the
traditional requirement that the just war be
declared.
27 Some see an element of presumption in any
such universal assertion. M. Friedman, The
Covenant of Peace, PENDLE

HILL

PAMPHLET

No. 110, at 17 (1960).
28 See Macgill, supra note 19, at 1389-93.
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tion and passion, it is required of a man
that he should share the passion and action
of his time at peril of being judged not to
have lived."' 29 But this consolation is not
available to a conscientious objector, and
in the same passage, though conscientious
objection was far from his subject, Holmes
exempted from his words men with religious scruples.
The conscientious objection, then, has
been a recognition that some men are genuinely inhibited from sharing in the passion of their time. They have thought too
deeply, and in the wrong direction, to be
reached by the rhetoric of war or the realities behind it so we do not force them to
come and give mere physical service. A
society which sees itself only in terms of
coercible citizens, coercing laws, and coerced behavior, would not have a conscientious objector privilege. But if the nation
thinks of itself as having a purpose clear
enough to command the assent of citizens
with minds of their own,3 then it sees no
point in coercing those who genuinely do
not share the national purpose. Our society of course is not firmly committed to

either of these two views of itself-we
coerce taxes without the slightest hesitation.' But before Vietnam we always
started drafting people during moments of
rare concord, and we could make a concession worthy of the ideal state: we could
excuse those who dissented from the concord. In this sense we have never had a
compulsory draft in the way the criminal
law or taxes are compulsory. Before Vietnam the draft was a way of shaking loose
and channelling the community's enthusiasm, and there was no need to caulk up the
seams, as there is with taxes and the crim32
inal law.
This theory, of course, would admit a
selective objector as freely as any other.
But let us put aside the merits of the
quarrel and ask the simpler question: does
the law now bar selective objection?

31 It is not that we respect such objections less,
but that paying a tax is not a participatory ac-

tivity. We do not expect taxpayers to wear
ribbons and show their wounds to their grandchildren. But see the proposal co-sponsored by

Sens. Clark, Scott, Goldwater and Lausche to
exempt Amish from the Social Security tax. 110
CONG.

29 When it was felt so deeply as it was on both
sides that a man ought to take part in the war
unless some conscientious scruple or strong practical reason made it impossible, was that feeling
simply the requirement of a local majority that
their neighbors should agree with them? I
think not. I think the feeling was right-in the
South as in the North. I think that, as life is
action and passion, it is required of a man that he
should share the passion and action of his time
at peril of being judged not to have lived. Address to the Grand Army of the Republic post
at Keene, N.H., Memorial Day, 1884. 1
0. HOLMES, SPEECHES 6-7 (1962).

30T.

GILBY,

O.P., BETWEEN COMMUNITY

SOCIETY, ch. 20 (1953).

AND

REC. 21354-60 (1964). The rationale I

offer also suggests that conscientious objection
should be more closely tied to the registrant's
life-style than to the abstract content of his con-

viction. Cf. the enunciation of the standard in
terms of what place the belief occupies in the
registrant's life in United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163, 166 (1964).

The registrant in United

States v. Lewis, 275 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D. Wis.
1967), for instance, had gone south to put his
commitment to his people into practice; it would

make more sense to exempt him from the nation's wars than a person who had honestly
reached a theoretical pacifism, but had gone on

living as before.
32 Judge Wyzanski

would carry this to its fullest

implication: that we do not really have a draft,

at least not in the final analysis of each case.
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I. Where Does the All-Wars
Requirement Come From?
The rule that a conscientious objector
must object to all wars was invented by
Judges Clark, Frank and Augustus Hand
of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in 1943.33 They needed it because
they read the conscientious objector exemption to include socialists, agnostics, and
others not conventionally religious. They
had to set some boundary or their liberality
would have exempted almost anyone.
The statute does not clearly require that
the objection be to all wars:
Nothing in this title shall be construed
to require any person to be subject to

combatant training and service in the
armed forces of the United States who,
by reason of religious training and belief,
is conscientiously opposed to participation
in war in any form. .....4

The phrase in any form could modify war
or participation. Grammar would argue it
modifies the thing it is next to, war, but
some courts have said it modifies only participation.)rl Also arguing that it modifies

United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135
F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943); United States v.
Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
3450 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1964), 81 Stat.
100, 104.
35 "The words 'in any form' obviously relate, not
to 'war' but to 'participation in' war ... .
Taffs v. United States, 208 F.2d 329, 331 (8th
33

Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 928 (1954).

This statement has been quoted by T. Oscar
Smith, head of the Conscientious Objector Section at the Justice Department. See his recommendation in Spiro's case, set out as Appendix
F to petition for certiorari, Spiro v. United
States, 384 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 390

only participationare the cases denying the
exemption to men because they have
worked in defense factories, or have said
they would not mind contributing to defense in some non-military role."! If such
indirect participation can bar the exemption, in any form must exhaust its force
on participationbefore it gets to war.
The phrase war in any form would be
quite awkward and uninformative since a
recognized conscientious objector need not
object to violence, "7 and the difference
between war and violence is a matter of
form. 38 Most selective objectors lay down

criteria that do not turn on the form of
the war-the Thomistic just war criteria,
e.g., most of which concern the circumstances of the war. So, if the statute meant
the objector must object to participation in
all wars, it should have said "all wars"

U.S. 956 (1967). And, of course, see Sicurella v.
United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955), discussed

below.
36 De Remer v. United States, 340 F.2d 712 (8th
Cir. 1965), aff'g 221 F. Supp. 553 (D. Minn.
1963); Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375,
382 (1955); United States v. Moore, 217 F.2d
428 (7th Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds,
348 U.S. 966 (1955); Roberson v. United States,
208 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1953). But see Attorney
General Kennedy's memo of March 12, 1963,
Appendix B to government's brief confessing
error in Harshman v. United States, 372 U.S.
607 (1963) and Parker v. United States, 372
U.S. 608 (1963).
37Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385
(1955); Fleming v. United States, 344 F.2d 912
(10th Cir. 1965); United States v. Lauing, 221
F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1955).
,3s "War, generally speaking, has only one form,
namely a struggle between opposing forces;
whereas a person's participation therein may be
in a variety of forms." Judge Medina in United
States v. Hartman, 209 F.2d 366, 371 (2d Cir.
1953).
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rather than "participation in war in any
form."
Thus the statute does not dictate an all
wars requirement, or at least not with a
39
clarity that compels judicial acceptance.
Apparently the all-wars requirement was
never suggested before World War 11. The
World War I statute required that the objection be one that the objector's church
had held before the war. 40 This was an
implicit all-wars requirement, but of course
it is not found in the present statute. I find
no pre-World War II case suggesting either
logic or the Constitution makes the all wars
requirements necessary. 41 Then, in 1943
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit produced a pair of cases embracing
the all wars requirement as the essence of
religion. The theory behind these cases
seems to be that an objection held with
enough fervor will spread to cover all wars.

3 There is yet another reading of the statute
which I concede there is no authority for: "con-

scientiously opposed to war in any form" could
mean, opposed to any one of the divers forms
of war. This would make sense if the statute were
meant to protect someone from being drafted
when there was a danger that a war he might
object to might arise later, after he was already
under military discipline.
40 40 Stat. 76, 78, ch. 15, § 4 (May 18, 1917).
The state militia laws usually took similar institutional criteria. See, e.g., MAss. STAT. ch. 73
(1799) and ch. 103 (1809) requiring certificates
from a Quaker meeting. The Civil War draft
was similar, 13 Stat. 9, ch. 13, § 17 (Feb. 24,
1864). (The first Civil War draft, 12 Stat. 731,
March 3, 1863, had no conscientious objection
clause).
41 Dole v. Allen, 4 Me. (4 Greenl.) 527 (1827);
Lees v. Childs, 17 Mass. 351 (1821); White
v. McBride, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb) 61 (1815). See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 12 Mass. (11 Tyng)
441 (1815).

.It is not explained why so much fervor is

demanded. I suggest it is because the second circuit was extending the privilege to
worldly objectors, and needed some safety
device to keep the exemption from becoming promiscuously available.
The first case was United States v.
Kauten42 which upheld a conviction for
refusal to report for induction, and added
the all-wars requirement by way of lyric
dicta. The findings are not too clear on the
content of Kauten's philosophy. He opposed war because he was against infringements on the "individual qualities of a person, '
and he was distressed by the animosities loose in Europe. Kauten thought
Roosevelt wanted the draft because of unemployment; the hearing officer said
Kauten's opposition to the "present war is
greatly influenced by his dislike of our
44
present administration.
The court, per Augustus Hand, said
Kauten had not qualified because he was
not religious. But rather than let the matter
rest there, they then enthused on the nature
of religion:
It is unnecessary to attempt a definition
of religion; the content of the term is found
in the history of the human race and is
incapable of compression into a few words.
Religious belief arises from a sense of the
inadequacy of reason as means of relating
the individual to his fellow-men and to his

42

133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943). Registrants

often assume that killing is the principal vice of

war from the religious point of view, but the
idea that military discipline is contrary to a

proper respect for man's nature is also capable
of religious expression.
43

Id. at 707.

44

Id.

15
universe-a sense common to men in the
most primitive and the most highly civilized societies. It accepts the aid of logic
but refuses to be limited by it. It is a belief
finding expression in a conscience which
categorically requires the believer to disregard elementary self-interest and to accept martyrdom in preference to transgressing its tenets. A religious obligation
forbade Socrates, even in order to escape
condemnation, to entreat his judges to
acquit him, because he believed it was
their sworn duty to decide questions without favor to anyone and only according
to law. Such an obligation impelled Martin
Luther to nail his theses on the door of
the church at Wittenberg and, when he
was summoned before Emperor Charles
and the Diet at Worms, steadfastly to hold
his ground and to utter the often quoted
words! "I neither can nor will recant anything, since it is neither right nor safe to
act against conscience. Here I stand. I
cannot do other. God help me. Amen."
Recognition of this obligation moved the
Greek poet Menander to write almost
twenty-four hundred years ago: "Conscience is a God to all mortals;" impelled
Socrates to obey the voice of his "Daimon"
and led Wordsworth to characterize "Duty"
as the "Stern Daughter of the Voice of
45
God."
46

"ReliLyric passages make bad law.
gion" here is broad; we canvass religions
on a cross-cultural tour, from primitive

CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER

1969

man to Wordsworth. This gives the passage
an air of openhanded toleration. But because of this toleration of differing Gods,
the passage is rather demanding of man:
it asks a fervor and stubborness few men
ever reach.
The all-wars requirement seems to be
only an implicit part of this fervor:
There is a distinction between a course
of reasoning resulting in a conviction that
a particular war is inexpedient or disastrous
and a conscientious objection to participation in any war under any circumstances.
The latter, and not the former, may be the
basis of exemption under the Act. The
former is usually a political objection,
while the latter, we think, may justly be
regarded as a response of the individual to
an inward mentor, call it conscience or
God, that is for many persons at the present time the equivalent of what has always
47
been thought a religious impulse.
No reason is given why religion should be
equated with generality. There is no discussion, for example, of the problem the
Bishops now raise: what if the inward
mentor, call it conscience or God, should
say, take no part in wars that have grown
far beyond their justification. We are given
only an ipse dixit: conscientious objections
run to war under any circumstances, political objections run to particular wars.
If the Kauten case stood alone it could

Id. at 708.
46 Potter sees this decision as a "misstep possessing the marks of tragedy in which two worthy
but incompatible demands collide." RELIGION
Prof.
AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 44, 60 (1968).
Potter thinks the breach in the all-wars requirement, which he never questions as the present
law, could best be made by a clearly religious
objector.
45

be read as resting on the worldly or politof Kauten's objection. But
shortly thereafter, in United States ex rel.
ical nature

47 United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708

(2d Cir. 1943).
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Phillips v. Downer,48 two of the same
judges, Clark and Augustus Hand, distinguished Kauten and reemphasized that it
rested on the particularity of Kauten's objection.
The Phillips case is often cited for its
liberality in interpreting "religious." Phillips' opposition to war admittedly came
from a reading of "philosophers, historians
and poets from Plato to Shaw."4 " The hearing officer said it was hard to tell whether
his objection came from "philosophical
and humanitarian concepts which are
deemed to have the essence of religious
thought, or whether they more largely
result from his political convictions and his
dissatisfaction with our present way of
life." 0 The court said there was no evidence that his political conviction excluded
all religious feeling, and thus gave the exemption to a man who was religious only
in a very wide reading of the word.
But Phillips did oppose all wars, and all
violence for that matter, and the second
circuit relied on that to distinguish Kauten:
It is to be noted that the facts differ
from those upon which we relied in the
Kauten case as an alternative ground for
affirmance of the conviction there. For
here the opposition to war was a deepseated one applying to war in general and
was not based upon political objections to
this particular war. 51
Then the court quoted the above language

48

135 F.2d 521, 523 (2d Cir. 1943).

49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.

from Kauten equating particularity with
politicalness, adding nothing to it to explain why God and conscience cannot
speak in specifics. We have only the implication that a belief held with enough fervor
52
would blur out to condemn all wars.
Thus the two cases together do spell out
a requirement that the objection be to all
wars. But they do so while saying the privilege would be available to many men
whose thinking is, in the common estimation, secular, not religious. The second
circuit's liberality has been rejected, 3 and
the exemption is limited to religious persons, so this peculiar safety device should
be obsolete. It was never more than an
ambitious gloss on the word "religious,"
supported not by judicial or philosophical
citation, but by an assumption as to where
enthusiasm would run if it outran reason.
The assumption was only an ipse dixit,
and events have flatly discredited it: religious impulses do sometimes lead to objections to particular wars. So Kauten and
Phillips need no longer command respect
for an all-wars requirement.
II. Where Does the All-Wars
Requirement Stand Now?
When the statute was re-written in
1948,54 nothing was done to adopt the all-

Macgill has reviewed all the possible reasons
in support of this view. The reasons are all his,
however, not the courts'; the courts have given
no reason at all for this. See Macgill, supra note
19.
5 That is, by the 1948 re-writing of the statute,
discussed in the next section.
54 62 Stat. 604, 612-13 (1948).
52
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wars requirement. And the second circuit's
wide view of the word "religious" was disapproved, so with it, by implication the allwars requirement was rejected.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had expressly rejected the second
circuit's view of religion in 1946. In United
States v. Berman,f5 Berman was a socialist,
and he claimed religion by a letter from a
theologian saying that any theory for the
betterment of mankind is a religion. This
would probably have worked in the second
circuit, since Berman definitely opposed all
wars, but the ninth circuit turned down his
claim. They quoted the words of Chief
Justice Hughes, which were later added to
the statute almost verbatim:
The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to
those arising from any human relation.5 6
And since the ninth circuit was comfortably limiting the exemption to traditional
God-fearing religionists, it had no need to
ask them hypothetical questions about
when their God might let them fight.
In 1948 the draft was revived, and the
ninth circuit's view was written into the
57
statute:
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nection means an individual's belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral
code.58
The Senate report on this cites Berman,
and does not cite any of the cases from the
second circuit which require that the objection be to all wars.; 9
More direct is the silence of the statute.
Congress was dealing quite clearly with the
question of what kind of religion is needed,
and never said it must be a religion that
rejects all wars under all circumstances.
Again in 1967 Congress re-wrote this section without clarifying the all-wars issue. 60
By then Sicurella v. United States6' had
been on the books twelve years, and Congress could not have been unaware that
objections to a specific war were becoming
a problem. 62 So the failure to spell out an
all-wars requirement shows legislative intent to leave it out.
Judicial authority on the all-wars question is scarce. The Supreme Court has
faced the problem once, in Sicurella v.
United States,63: and rejected the require-

Religious training and belief in this con-

55 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946).
56 Id. at 381, quoting Mr. Justice Hughes' dissent in United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S.
605, 633-34 (1931).
57 In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163,
177-79 (1964), the Court claims to see no conflict
between the 9th and 2d circuits. But this is on
the issue of belief in God, and the whole opinion
is distorted by the attempt to save the constitutionality of the statute, as admitted by Mr.
Justice Douglas, 380 U.S. at 188.

r5 62 Stat. 613, as amended, 50 U.S.C. APP.
456(j), 81 Stat. 104 (1967).
5) S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1989,
2002 (1948) (accompanying S. 2655).
6
OPub. L. No. 90-40, 81 Stat. 100 (June 30,
1967).
61 348 U.S. 385 (1955).
62 H. REP. No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1308,
1333 (1967); CONFERENCE

REP. No. 346, 90th

Cong., 1st Sess. 1359 (1967).
63 348 U.S. 385 (1955). This case came out of
the insistence by T. Oscar Smith, head of the
Conscientious Objector Section in the Justice De-
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ment. There are three recent cases in lower
courts going the other way: two are ambiguous, United States v. Kurki, ;4 and United
States v. Shermeister,65 and the third, United
States v. Spiro,66 suggests a purely sectarian limit to Sicurella, but the third circuit
affirmed without discussing this point, and
certiorari was denied. 67 So the case law,
far from supporting an all-wars rule, is
dominated by the Supreme Court's rejection of the requirement of Sicurella.6 s
Sicurella was a Jehovah's Witness who
accepted the rule of the Witnesses that they
will not serve in the army, but under certain circumstances they will use violence
personally. Their teaching is unclear to a
pragmatic mind searching their literature
for factual ethics, because they are interested in a literal interpretation of scripture
and tend to give unusual values to words.
They take "pacifist," for instance, as a

partment, that Jehovah's Witnesses were not to
get the exemption if they agreed with their
sect's published views on self-defense and
theocratic wars. Appendix B to the Petition for
Certiorari, Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S.
385 (1955); United States v. Close, 215 F.2d 439
(7th Cir. 1954). The Courts of Appeal reversed
many such cases. Taffs v. United States, 208 F.2d
329 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 928
(1954); United States v. Hartman, 209 F.2d 366
(2d Cir. 1954). The story is set out in United
States v. Hagaman, 213 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1954).
64 255 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Wis. 1966).
65 286 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
66 384 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1967).
67 390 U.S. 956 (1967).
68 Noyd v. McNamara, 267 F. Supp. 701 (D.
Colo.), alj'd, 378 F.2d 538 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1022 (1967), dealt with a
selective objector in the service, but the merits
were never reached. There is a rejection of selective objection in United States v. Valentine, 288
F. Supp. 95 7 (D.P.R. 1968), but it is only dicta.
One of the many charges against Cassius Clay

derogatory epithet.6 "9 But apparently two
general categories of violence are approved
by the Witnesses: they will personally fight
to defend themselves, other Witnesses, or
"Kingdom interests," such as the right to
preach; and they see themselves as the
modern-day chosen people, and they will
fight when Jehovah orders them out, as He
often ordered out the Jews in Old Testa70
ment history.
There is much authority saying that a
belief in personal violence, as in self-defense, does not bar the exemption, 71 so the
first of these two doctrines could not have
barred Sicurella. But the second form of
fighting, the theocratic war, is inescapably
a kind of war, and if Sicurella got the exemption the Supreme Court had to reject
the all-wars requirement.
The Court rejects the requirement expressly. In speaking of two articles from
the February 1, 195 1, Watchtower, the
Jehovah's Witness magazine, they say their
admissibility as evidence need not be decided because the articles are not dispositive of the controversy:
Granting that these articles picture Jehovah's Witnesses as antipacifists, extolling the

is that his objection is selective, but the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also ruled
against his sincerity and the all-wars requirement
is not discussed beyond a citation to Kauten.
Clay v. United States, 397 F.2d 901, 918-21

(5th Cir. 1968).
69 Why Jehovah's Witnesses are not Pacifists,
WATCHTOWER, Feb. 1, 1951, at 67.
70 Id.
71 SicUrella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385
(1955); United States v. Lauing, 221 F.2d 425
(7th Cir. 1955); Clark v. United States, 217 F.2d
511 (9th Cir. 1954).

15
ancient wars of the Israelites and ready to
engage in "theocratic war" if Jehovah so
commands them, and granting that the
Jehovah's Witnesses will fight at Armageddon, we do not feel this is enough. The
test is not whether the registrant is opposed
to all war, but whether he is opposed, on
72
religious grounds, to participationin war.
A clearer rejection of the all-wars requirement could not be asked.
But the clarity of this is elsewhere obscured. The Court seems to say that the
theocratic war of the Jehovah's Witnesses is
a spiritual conflict, a war only in a metaphorical sense. On his Form 150, the application for exemption, Sicurella suggested
this: "Inasmuch as the war weapons of the
soldier of Christ Jesus are not carnal, I
am not authorized by his commander to
engage in carnal warfare of this world";
in using force for defense of others and
defense of Kingdom interests, "we do not
arm ourselves or carry carnal weapons in
anticipation of or in preparation for trouble
or to meet threats . . . . I do not use
weapons of warfare in defense of myself
or the Kingdom interests. '7 3 But all of
Sicurella's statements were directed to selfdefense and defense of Kingdom interests,
things admitted permitted a conscientious
objector, and none of them expressly limited the holy war ordered by Jehovah. Nor
is there anything else in the record showing
a modern holy war would differ from the
wars Jehovah ordered in the Old Testament. There is a great deal of mythical language showing a reluctance to face the

72

348 U.S. at 390.

73 Government exhibit 2W, Record in Sicurella

v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1954).
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issues in operative terms; but precisely
because of this reluctance the Witnesses
do not meet the all-wars requirement in its
pure sense. They cannot assure us that they
will never fight in a war.
In Kretchet v. United States74 a dissenting judge wanted to distinguish Sicurella
on the ground that Sicurella would never
have used carnal weapons whereas Kretchet
expressly said he would if Jehovah ordered
him to. The majority on the ninth circuit
75
rejected this reading of Sicurella.
The Court also suggested it might be
influenced by the unlikelihood of Sicurella's
theocratic war:
As to theocratic war, petitioner's willingness to fight on the orders of Jehovah is
tempered by the fact that, so far as we
know, their history records no such command since Biblical times and their theology does not appear to contemplate one in
76
the future.
But this is thin ground on which to limit
the case. True, there was no evidence in
the case that a call to war by Jehovah was
imminent, waiting only on some combination of political events. But the government's brief included some Old Testament
prophecies the Witnesses have read into
77
political events. According to one book,
the Witnesses saw the First World War as

74284 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1960).
7'SThe Jehovah's Witness in United States v.
Stankewicz, 124 F. Supp. 27 (W.D. Pa. 1954),
was also explicit in his willingness to fight in a
war authorized by Jehovah.
76 Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385, 39091 (1955).
77 SIBLEY

AND JACOB,

SCIENCE (1952).
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a fulfillment of the prophecy of Daniel of
a great war between the "King of the
North" and the "King of the South." Once
they admit the possibility of finding Old
Testament prophecies in the actual affairs
of the contemporary world, it seems to my
logic at any rate, that they admit the possibility of a real theocratic war. Again
Kretchet provides a clarifying note: the
defendant there expressly said that someone on earth might be the spokesman for
Jehovah in the declaration of holy war.
The holy war is then no more unlikely
than a just war, but Kretchet was granted
the exemption.
Thus Sicurella allowed the exemption to
men who cannot assure us they will never
fight. Perhaps their inability to make this
assurance is due more to reluctance to
speak factually about their religious structure than to an actual reservation in favor
of war in certain situations. But still the
case disposes of the all-wars requirement:
an admission that he might at some time
fight, or a refusal to say he will never fight
in a war, need not always bar a registrant
from an exemption to which he is otherwise entitled.
But this does not shut out the possibility
that there is some other kind of all-wars
requirement conditioned, maybe, on the
type of selectivity the registrant is exercising. I find after Sicurella only three cases
claiming to refuse exemptions because the
registrant did not object to all wars. 78 Two

Kurki70 where the registrant was trying to
get around his failure to exhaust administrative remedies by saying Seeger had been
the first intimation his kind of objection
could get an exemption. In rejecting this
the court said Seeger had not changed the
registrant's position, since he was still ineligible because of the all-wars requirement.
The force of this is somewhat blunted by
the affirmance by the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit with no mention of
the all-wars problem.8 0 The other case is
United States v. Shermeister8 l where Shermeister had attached statements to his two
Forms 150 insisting his objection was limited to Vietnam. He was held guilty for his
failure to submit to induction, but there
were many other factors. He did not claim
a conscientious objection till he had been
refused a hardship deferment; he did not
sign the statement of objection on the
Form .150 till the day he was to report.
The court does not say what attempt Shermeister made to show he was religious; it
seems from his insistence on the specificity
of his objection he might have made no
attempt at all.
So these two cases do not suggest any
rule against any particular school of selective objection. But the third case, United
States v. Spiro 2 suggests that, in the Justice Department Conscientious Objector
Section at least, Catholic just war objectors
are not entitled to the exemption, Sicurella
notwithstanding.

of them do not suggest any ground for limiting Sicurella. One is United States v.

71

78 See also United States v. Valentine, 288 F.
Supp. 957 (D.P.R. 1968) (dicta).

390 U.S. 926 (1968).
81 286 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
82 384 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 956 (1968).

255 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Wis. 1966).

80 384 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
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Spiro was a Catholic who objected to
going into the army because he was sure
no future war would be a just war. The
hearing officer conceded his sincerity, but
it is not clear just what beliefs this concession extended to. The hearing officer
understood Spiro to object only to wars in
which noncombatants are killed. He noted
Spiro had said he would not object to an
army which used only bullets and shot only
at other soldiers.8" But Spiro took a different view in the letter he sent to the appeal
board in rebuttal to the Justice Department
recommendation. There he reduced the just
war to a mere conceptual possibility:
The very fact of the existence of a
nuclear potential rules out the possibility
of assurance of a just war. The same thing
was said of the invention of gunpowder,
and in fact I agree with that as well. I
can find no example of war since the invention of gunpowder of which I can say
it began, was conducted, and ended justly.
For that matter, nor can I find an example
of war before the invention of gunpowder
which met all the criteria of the teachings
of my church ...
I maintain that this "just" war is, in
the real world, not capable of occurring; that as a result of the Sin of Adam
and the consequent Corruption of the Human Will, it is inconceivable that a just
war will ever happen-since there never
has been one, as far as I can tell, and I
hardly expect that Men will suddenly
84
change.
If this is accepted as Spiro's position,
there is only one ground on which he can

Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 29A,
Spiro v. United States, 384 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.
83

1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
sMId. at 32A-33A.
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be distinguished from Sicurella: Spiro
spelled out the characteristics of his just
war, whereas the Jehovah's Witnesses speak
of their theocratic war only in mythic
terms. As the government said in its brief
in Spiro: "The hearing officer concluded
that petitioner's minor premise-that the
United States was inevitably committed to
indiscriminate mass bombing of civilians
and use of nuclear weapons-was not a
religious belief based on fact but was essentially a historical prediction of a political
nature . . . ."8 That is, the registrant may
object to wars selectively so long as his
basis of selectivity is inarticulated, based
on inspiration rather than reason, or does
not involve the kind of fact weighing characteristic of a Congressional decision.
This is quite different from the original
rationale implied in Kauten and Phillips,
because Spiro's fervor is not lessened by
his just war, at least not in any way
Sicurella's was not lessened by his theocratic war. Spiro seems to disagree with the
government in terms the government claims
to recognize, not in terms it is committed
to ignore, like Sicurella's vision. Potter,
though he is in favor of recognizing selective objection, says that a selective objector is in theory a revolutionary:
The subject matter he treats is not the
nature of his own calling but rather the
nature of the true state . . . .He is, in
relation to the incumbent powers, essentially subversive, a subversive made more
dangerous by the nobility of the norms he
invokes.86

8; Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 6, United
States v. Spiro, 384 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
84 See Potter, supra note 21.
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Thus the rule in Spiro's case might be: be
as selective as you like, but only Congress
may reason, and if we catch you reasoning
you can't be exempted from the draft. If
this were the rule it would rest not on the
words "war in any form" in the statute,
87
but on a reading of the word "religious.
This would be more than a rule against
selective objection, an all-wars rule, but it
would exclude just war objectors and many
other selective objectors.
But this cannot be the rule, because the
program has never been administered this
way. This reading would shout out any
pacifist, no matter how absolute or universal, if he were found to say anything
outside the mythic styles of speech. And
we know that many traditional conscientious objectors, and many pacifists, and
many members of the traditional peace
churches, and the three defendants in the
Seeger case,18 do reason, and do speak to
the norms the state claims to serve.
The basic error behind a rule against
factual selectivity is the attempt to explain
the conscientious objector exemption as a
case where the strictures against impeaching government decisions do not logically
apply. This is not the true case. The government is logically impeached, in one way
or another, by any objector, whether he
is a Quaker who says the government has
failed to grasp the full meaning of justice
and peace, a Jehovah's Witness who says
it is irrelevant to everything that ought to
concern a man (is that statement not antisocietal?), or a Catholic who says it has

8750 U.S.C. APP. § 456(j)

(1964).

88 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1964).

failed to keep its sense of proportionality.
The only impeachment of governmental
decisions that carries no threat at all is
that of a madman. Indeed, some of the
popular toleration of the conscientious objector law may rest on a belief that they
are a little mad," but clearly Seeger, or the
average Quaker, is not. On the contrary,
they address themselves very squarely to
things the government is supposed to serve,
like justice, the public safety, etc. If we
excuse conscientious objectors it has to be
for some such reason as I have suggested:
because we have decided with military service to proceed without true coercion, without the usual governmental prerogative of
having the final say on both major and
minor premises in each particular case, and
if we have done that it is because we were
acting in a rare moment of national concord when we were sure most people would
decide the government's way.
The rule against factual selectivity was
not endorsed by the only published opinion
in Spiro's case, that of the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit,!"' which says on the
merits only that there was some basis for
holding Spiro draftable. This could have
been anything, including the suddenness of
his discovery that his church was against
war."' So Spiro's case is not legal authority
for a rule against factual selectivity, but
it shows that such a rule will often appear
and deny the exemption to men such as
Catholic just war objectors.

89 Sen. Morse has said as much. 94 CONG. REC.
7278, 7304 (1948).
90 384 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1967).
91 And, as noted above, there were no opinions
written when the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
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Ill. Why Does the All-Wars Requirement
Survive in the Face of the Legal
Authority Against It?
Thus we have shown that the statute
does not require that an objector oppose
all wars; that such a requirement can find
little judicial authority but two ill-explained
cases in the second circuit; and that the
Supreme Court had expressly ruled that
an objector need not oppose all wars.
Other commentators have ably argued that
any such all-wars requirement would raise
serious Constitutional questions by discriminating between religions for no compelling reason. Yet local boards go on asking questions like the one set out above
about repelling an invasion, and go on refusing exemptions to registrants who hesitate to say they would never fight in any
conceivable war.
The strongest force keeping the all-wars
requirement alive is the notion that religion should speak only in verbal formulas
that are thought to represent moral unchangeables-that questions of fact are less
holy than questions of true theory, and
must be left to Caesar. The Justice Department's comments in Spiro's appeal suggest
this notion of religion92 it is implied in the
Kautenll* and Phillips9"4 opinions, and General Hershey's response 5 to the Bishop's
statement seemed to rest on this belief. This
is indeed a central thesis of some religions.

92

Respondent's Brief in Opposition, at 6, Spiro

v. United States, 384 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
90 United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d
Cir. 1943).
94 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943).
95 N.Y.Times, Nov. 17, 1968, at 34, col. 1.

CATHOLIC

LAWYER,

SUMMER

1969

There are, of course, good religious arguments for enunciated universal rules.
First, there is the feeling that such rules are
a firmer guide to conduct, that persons
admitting no change in rules are less likely
to do the wrong thing out of confusion or
weakness; some feel the "existential ethics"
of modern theologians is less demanding
than rule-forming ethics. 6 Then there are
faiths where the attachment to verbal universals comes naturally from a belief in a
revealed holy text. And among Catholics
the habit of rule-forming has been a deeply
ingrained point of style since the days of
the Schoolmen.
These are good religious reasons for the
use of universal formulas, but they are religious reasons. Asking a citizen to take a
stand on them is as much a test oath as
asking him to abjure transubstantiation.
Macgill has spelled out the Constitutional
reasons against this,"' but it would still be
a bad idea even if not unconstitutional.
Most of us feel a system of universal verbal
formulas is inevitably a fairly unsophisticated system of ethics, since we believe no
one can go very far in the study of ethics,
or law, or history, without learning about
the universal defeasibility of English sentences.9 8

9;For a sounder survey see Existential Ethics, 5
NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 724 (1967); Situational Ethics, 13 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA

268 (1967).
97 See Macgill, supra note 19.
98 See Friedman, supra note 27, at 17; Carl
Cohen, THE NATION, July 8, 1968, at 12. Friedman makes this a central part of his faith: he
holds with Martin Buber, that the Commandments are invitations to respond correctly to the
situations in the world, not prohibitions inhibiting such response.
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Surely the strongest reason for the nullifying of Sicurella is an actual disagreement
with the policy of exempting objectors, a
disagreement hardly surprising in light of
the vision of a consensual society the policy
springs from, and the actual state of our
society after four years of Vietnam. The
Marshall Commission found many board
members will admit this disagreement. t!
We do not know whether this reflects general public sentiment, or whether the system of unpaid volunteers has produced
boards as unrepresentative of community
thinking as they are of the general distribution of race and class. 1 0 I myself think
that if the question were coming up for the
first time there would be much opposition
to any form of conscientious objection
now. Vietnam has been peculiar among
American wars in the narrowness of its impact; there has been no rationing, no excess
profits tax, no rhetoric about civilians doing
their part; the burden has fallen on a few
men, who are supposed to bear it with
stoicism, not enthusiasm. A nation willing
to draft its young men under these circumstances may have already made the decision to treat them as objects of national
policy, not as participants in a national pur-

99 MARSHALL REPORT at 108-09.
100 See Comment, supra note 5 at 2163. MARSHALL
REPORT,

at 73-81.

pose, and might see no reason to exempt
those whose full participation is inhibited.
But others10 1 have examined these arguments at length, and have found in Seeger
and in other first amendment cases ample
argument that a statute cannot give the
privilege to universal pacifists and deny it
to all selective objectors. I have only tried
to show that the statute did not in fact
make that dubious distinction, and the Supreme Court has held as much. Spiro is
not clear enough to stand as authority
contra.
If the draft keeps up it will raise much
more serious problems than the outlines of
the conscientious objection exemption.
There is no proper solution to our present
problems but to stop drafting ignorant boys
as well as learned ones, profane as well as
sincere. But if the draft is stopped, we still
have to think about the record we leave
behind: it should show the wide dissatisfaction with the draft, but it should not add
imaginary evils to the precedent. To this
end commentators should stop assuming
that the "present laws of this country, however, provide only for those whose reasons
of conscience are grounded in a total rejection of the use of military force.""' 2

'() See, e.g., Macgill, supra note 19; Mansfield,
supra note 20; Potter, supra note 21.
102 Human Life in Our Day, CATHOLIC STANDARD
(Supp.), Nov. 21, 1968, at 8, col. 3.

